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Although there is no more iconic, stalwart, and eloquent defender of liberty and representative democracy than
J. S. Mill, he sometimes endorses nondemocratic forms of governance. This article explains the reasons behind this
seeming aberration and shows that Mill actually has complex and nuanced views of the transition from
nondemocratic to democratic government, including the comprehensive and parallel material, cultural, institu-
tional, and character reforms that must occur, and the mechanism by which they will be enacted. Namely, an
enlightened despot must cultivate democratic virtues such as obedience, industriousness, spirit of nationality, and
resistance to tyranny in the population and simultaneously prepare the way for his own demise and secure his own
legitimacy by transitioning to the rule of law. This challenges recent scholarship that paints Mill’s nondemocratic
views as crudely and uncritically imperialist, because it fails to recognize and engage seriously with his sophisticated
(if ultimately problematic) theory of individual and institutional development under enlightened colonialism.
T
here appears to be an ‘‘emerging orthodoxy’’
among scholars that John Stuart Mill was an
uncritical, even morally obtuse apologist for
the British Empire and imperialism more generally
(Kohn and O’Neill 2006, 220). Mehta, for example,
has taken Mill to task for subordinating consent to
progress, which enabled him to conveniently over-
look the dark, exploitative side of empire, and for
allowing individual colonial subjects to be entirely
eclipsed by ‘‘collective histories’’ that decided their
‘‘differential rights and privileges’’ (1999, 111–12).
On similar grounds, Pitts has condemned Mill for
‘‘avoid[ing] the question of whether colonial rule
was inherently prone to abuse’’ (2005, 161). Several
scholars have begun to call this new orthodoxy into
question, however, not by denying Mill’s support for
an enlightened colonialism—of which there is copi-
ous textual evidence—but rather by showing that
such support was not based upon racist assumptions
about the intrinsic inferiority of subject peoples
(Muthu 2003, 279) and was far from uncritical or
unconditional. Kohn and O’Neill have shown, for
example, that Mill was ambivalent about British rule
in the West Indies, as evidenced in part by the Eyre
controversy, in which Mill led a parliamentary faction
calling for the trial of the colonial governor of
Jamaica for his egregious abuse of power during an
uprising there (2006, 213–17; also see Reeves 2007,
377–80).
Strangely, though, what has been wholly missing
from this recent debate is any detailed discussion of
what we call Mill’s theory of ‘‘enlightened despotism’’
and its application to colonial acquisition and admin-
istration. This elaborate developmental theory, which
explains how ‘‘backward’’ states and their citizens
can simultaneously approach liberal-democratic ideals
under the guidance of motivated despots, foreign or
domestic, animates Mill’s discussions of colonialism,
yet the participants in this debate have had remarkably
little to say about it. Mehta, for example, says that Mill
gives a ‘‘precisely articulated and specific developmen-
tal trajectory’’ along which enlightened despots must
move their societies, but he offers no description of it,
even in those parts of his book where he discusses
Considerations on Representative Government, its very
source (1999, 70–71, 73, 81–82, 103–104). Pitts (2005),
by contrast, appears to deny the existence of any such
trajectory: she contends that Mill offered us nothing
but a rough contrast between barbarian and civilized
societies (133, 136–37, 139), a crude historical story
with no analysis of ‘‘development within societies’’
(141), and a focus on individual ‘‘cognitive’’ (vs. ethical)
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development alone (142), claims which are all belied by
Considerations, as we shall see.1 Both Mehta and Pitts
sharply criticize Mill’s support for a British brand of
enlightened despotism, but no evaluation—much less
critique—of Mill’s position is possible without an
understanding of not only its details but also how it
applies within particular colonial contexts. Only
by examining these can we hope to pinpoint where
exactly his argument goes wrong; Urbinati rightly says
that ‘‘although this aspect of [Mill’s] thought has
received little analytical attention, it has been harshly
criticized’’ (2007, 69). A thorough and sympathetic
analysis must precede criticism—here, we offer both.2
We will first describe the basic features of Millian
enlightened despotism, especially as they are initially
sketched in On Liberty, and defend Mill against
charges of inconsistency. We then move on to the
main presentation of these ideas in Considerations,
where Mill describes how an enlightened despot
might shepherd a society through a multistage
process of development, one that involves not merely
institutional reform but also the reform of citizens’
characters.3 We consider here the pressing issue of
motivation: why would any despot, foreign or do-
mestic, work patiently towards his own displacement
by reforming political institutions and preparing his
subjects to take charge of them? As we shall see, Mill’s
underdeveloped response relies upon both the cun-
ning of history (with echoes of Kant) and a faith in
disinterested technocratic elites. Finally, we examine
in greater detail how Mill applies his theory of
enlightened colonialism to the most important of
the British dependencies and the one he discusses at
greatest length, India, to see what this reveals about
Mill’s theory and its limits. The point of our (re)ex-
amination of the relevant writings here is not a defense
of Mill’s enlightened despotism/colonialism per se, but
a defense of its coherence, its depth (as grounded in a
full theory of institutional and character develop-
ment), and its moral seriousness and self-critical




Immediately after stating his doctrine of liberty in On
Liberty, Mill qualifies it by noting that it applies
neither to children nor to ‘‘backward states of society
in which the race itself may be considered as in its
nonage’’ (OL 14).4 ‘‘Despotism’’ over such ‘‘barbar-
ians’’ may be warranted, Mill says, ‘‘provided the end
be their improvement, and the means justified by
actually effecting that end’’ (OL 14–15; cf. CRG 453:
‘‘vigorous despotism’’). Mill has in mind here the
despotism of Akbar, Charlemagne, and Peter the
Great, all of whom he suggests were filled with
‘‘the spirit of improvement’’ (OL 14; cf. CRG 264–
65). He also emphasizes, however, that such despot-
ism must be self-extinguishing to be legitimate: once
mankind is able to be improved by ‘‘conviction and
persuasion’’ and ‘‘free and equal discussion,’’ the
doctrine of liberty applies in full (OL 15). The strong
paternalism of this passage is explicit and unmistak-
able: barbarians are like children, and (good) despots
are like parents, whose rule over their charges is
justified and eventually terminated by their wards’
achievement of maturity and independence.5
1Pitts is by no means alone in making these claims. For example,
Mantena cites Pitts and follows her by arguing that Mill’s
historical stages ‘‘were never carefully elaborated’’ and were
‘‘rarely linked . . . with specific social structures, property rela-
tions, or modes of subsistence’’; moreover, she contends that ‘‘Mill
never specified in great detail what kinds of policies would educate
a subject population towards greater individuality’’ (2007, 304,
306). Again, all of these claims are belied by Considerations.
2Urbinati herself gives a sympathetic reconstruction of Mill’s
views on despotism in this very context before concluding her
piece on a critical note (2007, 74–80, 97). Moreover, she touches
on Mill’s developmental theory (79, 95) but does not pursue it or
its application to particular colonial contexts, as her concern is
elsewhere, viz. with the origins of the concept of despotism and
its multifarious but related uses in Mill’s writings. Also see
Tunick (2006) for a similarly sympathetic reconstruction, but one
very different from ours and Urbinati’s.
3Although we are certainly not the first to explore Mill’s science
of character formation (which he calls ‘‘Ethology’’ in his System
of Logic), we are the first to do so in the specific context of
his enlightened despotism. Ball (2000), for example, treats Mill’s
major works as ‘‘case studies in applied ethology’’; when he turns
to Considerations, however, he focuses wholly on Mill’s critique
of despotism there and on his related claim that ‘‘active
characters’’ are essential conditions of democratic government,
whereas we examine Mill’s qualified defense of despotism in this
same work as a means to character development in undeveloped
societies, thereby complementing Ball’s analysis (25, 40–43). Also
see the seminal work on Mill and character formation by
Himmelfarb (1974), especially Chapters 3, 5, and 10.
4We will use the following notations for Mill’s works: C 5
‘‘Civilization’’ (Mill 1977, 119–147); NI 5 ‘‘A Few Words on
Non-Intervention’’ (Mill 1984, 111–24); OL 5 On Liberty (Mill
1991, 1–128); U 5 Utilitarianism (Mill 1991, 129–202); CRG 5
Considerations on Representative Government (Mill 1991, 203–
468); SW 5 The Subjection of Women (Mill 1991, 469–582); and
PPE 5 Principles of Political Economy (Mill 1909). Mill defines
‘‘barbarism’’ as a dispersed population with a hunter/gatherer
economy and an anarchic lack of cooperation (C 120).
5As Mehta points out, Mill believes that whereas in advanced
conditions libertarian norms best advance utility, in ‘‘backward’’
conditions, ‘‘alternative norms’’ like enlightened despotism are
more effective (99, 102–103; cf. SW 517–18).
1240 yvonne chiu and robert s. taylor
This endorsement of enlightened despotism, how-
ever qualified it may be in both structure and applica-
tion, will strike many readers as grossly inconsistent
with Mill’s other discussions of despotism, which are
usually sharply critical of it. Such inconsistency is only
apparent, however. For example, when we turn to
Mill’s discussion of the Mormon institution of polyg-
amy and of the ‘‘unquenchable animosity’’ it sparks in
most Christians, we find Mill condemning interference
with the Mormons as a kind of ‘‘tyranny,’’ asserting
that ‘‘I am not aware that any community has a right to
force another to be civilized’’ (OL 102). This appears to
be in tension with earlier statements, but recall that
enlightened despotism was only appropriate where
the subject people were incapable of improvement
through ‘‘conviction and persuasion’’ and ‘‘free and
equal discussion’’ (OL 15). Mill clearly believed that
the Mormons were capable of being improved in this
way, however, as evidenced by his comment that their
critics should send ‘‘missionaries’’ to persuade them to
abandon their polygamous practices instead of pro-
posing a ‘‘civilizade’’ against them (OL 102–103).6 The
same holds true, and even more strongly, with respect
to the marital ‘‘law of despotism’’ that Mill so
vigorously critiqued in The Subjection of Women
(SW 501). Not only were women susceptible of
improvement through persuasion and discussion,
he argued, but also the sort of despotism practiced
within marriage distorted and degraded women’s
capacities—and men’s as well—instead of enhancing
them (SW 486–87, 493–94, 509–10, 520).7 Consistent
with his earlier statements in On Liberty, despotism
can only be justified when its end is improvement, its
means are fitted to that end, and its beneficiaries
cannot be helped by other, less coercive means, such
as persuasion. Neither Mormons nor women as a
class need such despotism; as Mill plainly states, only
children and ‘‘barbarians’’ require it.8
The passage of On Liberty cited above consists of
less than one paragraph, however, and its telegraphic
quality leaves many important questions unanswered.
For example, what should an enlightened despot
‘‘improve’’ about his subjects? What techniques
should he use to do so? Why would these improve-
ments eventually lead to their maturity and self-
government? Lastly, what would motivate a despot to
do any of these things? Fortunately, Mill sketches





In Considerations, Mill speaks of societies being at
different ‘‘stage[s] of advancement,’’ and what a
society at the lowest level of advancement (a state
of ‘‘fighting and rapine’’ and ‘‘savage independence’’)
needs is a despot, an ‘‘absolute ruler,’’ who will teach
it two virtues essential to civilized life: obedience and
patient industry (CRG 231–32). The former virtue,
bringing peace in its wake, is necessary for the
development of the latter, without which ‘‘neither
can the mind be disciplined into the habits required
by a civilized society, nor the material world prepared
to receive it’’; these twin virtues are of such weight
that even ‘‘personal slavery’’ might be justified as an
encouragement to them both, at least at this early
stage of social advancement (CRG 232; cf. C 123–24
and NI 119 [‘‘ . . . break their spirit . . . ’’]).
Mill is quick to recognize, however, that a people
of slaves under an absolute ruler, no matter how
enlightened he may be, will never be transformed into
a self-governing people unless they are led to acquire
further virtues. To usher his people on to ‘‘the next
necessary step in social progress,’’ such a ruler must
transform his own rule, changing it from ‘‘a govern-
ment of will to one of law’’ (CRG 233).9 The ruler, in
other words, must develop in his people ‘‘the capacity
to act on general instructions’’; he must maintain ‘‘a
general superintendence over all the operations of
society, so as to keep before each the sense of a
present force sufficient to compel his obedience to
the rule laid down, but which, owing to the impos-
sibility of descending to regulate all the minutiae of
6To be clear, Mill viewed polygamy as a ‘‘direct infraction’’ of his
principle of liberty but thought that so long as the Mormons did
not force their practice on others or prevent women from
escaping it via migration, they should remain unmolested (OL
102). This is consistent with his related opinion that ‘‘misman-
agement’’ or even ‘‘great rudeness and imperfection in the details
of public affairs’’ cannot by itself justify interference across
communities (SW 577).
7Mill’s belief that despotism, especially marital despotism, is
mutually degrading for despot and subject was shared by
Montesquieu, with whose work Mill was familiar: see both
Montesquieu’s portrayal of Usbek in The Persian Letters (1964)
and his broader treatment of the topic in The Spirit of the Laws
(1989).
8Fuchs (2001) defends Mill against charges of inconsistency for
his qualified endorsement of liberal paternalism.
9As Miller notes, ‘‘for Mill personally, the main issue at stake [in
the Eyre controversy] was ‘whether the British dependen-
cies . . . were to be under the government of law, or of military
license’’’ (2005, 159–60, 164).
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industry and life, necessarily leaves and induces indi-
viduals to do much of themselves’’ (CRG 233–34).
Mill is unclear about how this increased discre-
tion for the governed is to be introduced. His one
concrete example in the text—a ‘‘St. Simonian form
of socialism,’’ such as that practiced by the Jesuits in
Paraguay (CRG 233–34)—does not seem particularly
promising, given his critical discussion of this system
in Principles of Political Economy. Although socialism
of this variety, being noncommunistic, would ‘‘pro-
portion remuneration to labor’’ and thus avoid
communism’s disincentive to work, it would also
require a degree of ‘‘genius and virtue’’ on the part of
those who assigned workers to their stations (on the
basis of capacity and merit) that Mill finds ‘‘almost
too chimerical to be reasoned against’’ (PPE 211–13).
Are there alternative examples in Mill’s writings
that would serve his purposes better? One that might
fit the bill is so-called ‘‘peasant proprietorship,’’
discussed extensively in Political Economy and sharply
contrasted with slavery (PPE 256–301). Under peas-
ant proprietorship, ‘‘the whole produce [of the land]
belongs to a single owner,’’ i.e., the peasant himself;
alternatively, the peasant might pay a fixed rent to
either the landlord or the government (in which case
it is equivalent to a land tax) (PPE 256–57, 333). So
long as the rent is fixed, any produce beyond the rent
accrues to the peasant, providing a strong incentive
for labor. Consequently, the peasant may safely be
given a great deal of discretion with respect to
the disposition of his own labor and property. The
ruler’s managerial role is reduced to the general one
of distributing and enforcing property rights in land
and regulating rents. The purpose of such a system, as
Mill explains, is ‘‘more complete security of property;
moderate taxes, and freedom from arbitrary exaction
under the name of taxes; a more permanent and
more advantageous tenure of land, securing to the
cultivator as far as possible the undivided benefits
of . . . industry, skill, and economy’’ (PPE 189). These
desiderata are achieved by securing long, preferably
perpetual land tenure for peasants and by fixing rents
and land taxes for the length of that tenure, or at
minimum limiting their increase by custom or law
(PPE 257, 283, 333).
These ideas could have been applied to the British
colony of India. The Indian class whose situation was
most similar to that of the peasant proprietors were the
‘‘ryots,’’ or peasant farmers. As Mill explains, they are
‘‘not regarded as tenants at will, nor even as tenants by
virtue of a lease [but rather] are thought entitled to
retain their land, as long as they pay the customary
rents’’ (PPE 243–44). These rents, though, had a
tendency to increase over time (in real if not nominal
terms) due to the ‘‘fiscal rapacity . . . of the great
landholder, the State,’’ or the ‘‘illegal extortions’’ of
local administrators, so that the fixed rents of peasant
proprietorship were never achieved; as a result, ‘‘the
anomaly arose of a fixity of tenure in the peasant-
farmer, co-existing with an arbitrary power of increas-
ing the rent’’ (PPE 244, 325).
The reason that a move from slavery or serfdom
to peasant proprietorship would be ‘‘the next neces-
sary step in social progress’’ is that such a system not
only encourages industry (which slavery does, after
all) but also promotes the development of greater
virtues, such as intelligence, prudence, and self-
control (PPE 285–87). As Mill cogently argues,
‘‘mental faculties will be most developed where they
are most exercised; and what gives more exercise to
them than the having a multitude of interests, none
of which can be neglected, and which can be provided
for only by varied efforts of will and intelligence?’’
(PPE 285; cf. CRG 253–56). Peasant proprietors are
beset with so many concerns and anxieties that
their minds are constantly churning, unlike the dull,
stupefied minds of slaves.10 Moreover, because their
livelihood depends so strongly upon their own
decisions, they become very careful and temperate;
as Mill observes, ‘‘they deny themselves reasonable
indulgences, and live wretchedly in order to econo-
mize’’ (PPE 287).
In fact, Mill contends that ‘‘no other existing
state of agricultural economy has so beneficial an
effect on the industry, the intelligence, the frugality,
and prudence of the population’’ (PPE 300). Because
any surplus over rent and taxes accrues to the peasant
himself, he has a strong incentive not merely to labor
but also to plan, save, and invest, all of which
encourage the development of the aforementioned
virtues. Peasant proprietorship is thus ‘‘an instru-
ment of popular education,’’ one so effective that its
lesson is perhaps learned too well: ‘‘if there is a moral
inconvenience attached to [this system], it is the
danger of their being too careful of their pecuniary
10For this reason, Mill advocates the abolition of cottier tenancy
in Ireland, in which ‘‘the conditions of the [tenancy] contract,
especially the amount of rent, are determined not by custom but
by competition’’ (PPE 318). Such tenancy leads to rents so high,
and therefore remuneration of labor so low, that Mill remarks
despairingly, ‘‘What can a tenant gain by any amount of industry
or prudence, and what lose by any recklessness?... A situation
more devoid of motives to either labor or self-command,
imagination itself cannot conceive. The inducements of free
human beings are taken away, and those of a slave not
substituted . . . What race would not be indolent and insouciant
when things are so arranged, that they derive no advantage from
forethought or exertion?’’ (PPE 323–24).
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concerns . . . . But some excess in this direction
is . . . a cheap price to pay for the inestimable worth
of the virtue of self-dependence’’ (PPE 287).11
Unlike the virtues of obedience and patient
industry, which are necessary conditions for any
form of civilization, the bourgeois virtues of a
calculating intelligence, prudence, and self-control
are necessary conditions for only certain kinds of
civilization, including the democratic one. One of the
greatest threats to democratic self-government is the
demagogue, who exploits the fears and passions of
the masses in order to procure political power and
achieve dominance. Demagoguery maintains the
democratic form (by way of a plebiscitary politics)
but destroys its essence, which is deliberation and
compromise. Those given democratic freedoms and
responsibilities but not yet accustomed to the exercise
of the knowledge, understanding, self-restraint, and
respect they require will fall sway to demagogues or
their autocratic equivalents, something Mill would
have seen in his own lifetime and in his extensive
study of ancient Greek philosophy and history.
However, the bourgeois virtues of intelligence, pru-
dence, and self-control, if possessed by most of the
demos, deny the demagogue his foothold: citizens
who customarily consider the long-term consequen-
ces of decisions, act only with caution and fore-
thought, and keep their own impulsive desires in
check will be unmoved by his bullying rhetoric or by
farcical aquatic ceremonies. Thus, the virtues ac-
quired by the peasant proprietor are among those
required of a democratic citizen.12
This transition from a government of will to a
government of law, important though it is in groom-
ing citizens for self-government, is not the final
preparation. As Mill argues, an enlightened despot
must now encourage additional democratic virtues
among his subjects and equip them with institutions
that will eventually serve as the organs of collective
self-rule (CRG 260–66). The first of these virtues is,
paradoxically, a willingness to resist tyranny (CRG
261–62).13 This virtue serves as a needed counter-
point to the virtue of obedience: democratic citizens
must be as resistant to usurpers and to arbitrary rule
as they are conformable to lawful governance; the
tension between these two virtues is a healthy one for
a democracy. But by inculcating such a virtue, would
the enlightened despot not be undermining (in a very
immediate sense) his own rule? Not if the object of
resistance were local tyrants. Mill suggests, with
substantial historical support, that rulers can often
consolidate and strengthen their own rule by aligning
themselves with their subjects in struggles against
local oppression by, for example, feudal lords or even
landlords more generally, as suggested by his dis-
cussion of peasant proprietors; as Mill notes, ‘‘obe-
dience to a distant monarch is liberty itself compared
with the dominion of the lord of the neighboring
castle’’ (CRG 261).14
This resistance to local oppression is closely
related to the second of these virtues: that of a certain
spirit of nationality,15 which serves as an antidote to
the ‘‘inveterate spirit of locality’’ (CRG 262; also see
CRG 427–34). By being pressed into the service of a
central authority, subjects become familiarized with
the ‘‘large interests common to a considerable geo-
graphical extent,’’ an experience that extends their
knowledge beyond their local village or market town
and without which there cannot be ‘‘any largeness
either to their conceptions or their sentiments’’ (CRG
254, 263). Only a subject whose mind has been
expanded in this way is fit for democratic citizenship,
which requires deliberation and decision making
about matters of more than parochial interest.
But as Mill notes, one of the most effective ways
to encourage familiarity with these larger interests is
for a ruler to invite his subjects (or, more precisely,
11Mill also defends peasant proprietorship on Georgist grounds,
arguing that ‘‘the land of every country . . . belongs to the people
of that country . . . With regard to the land itself, the paramount
consideration is, by what mode of appropriation and of culti-
vation it can be made most useful to the collective body of its
inhabitants’’ (PPE 331). Although this mode will usually be
peasant proprietorship, Mill admits that ‘‘large farms, cultivated
by large capital, and owned by persons of the best education
which the country can give, persons qualified by instruction to
appreciate scientific discoveries, and able to bear the delay and
risk of costly experiments, are an important part of a good
agricultural system’’ (PPE 334). Barring this telling exception for
an educated agricultural elite, however, Mill’s defense of peasant
proprietorship is unstinting.
12Sullivan (1983, 615–17) and Kurfirst (1996, 80–83) have also
described peasant proprietors as proto-democratic citizens.
Sullivan sees the virtues of ‘‘effort, foresight, and prudence’’
acquired by such smallholders as preconditions of ‘‘liberal
cultural and political institutions’’ (615). Kurfirst similarly links
small-scale property ownership to both ‘‘intellectual and moral
development’’ and ‘‘human freedom and self-government’’ (82).
13Few in Mill’s time exemplified this virtue better than Giuseppe
Mazzini, republican revolutionary and advocate of Italian uni-
fication. Mill, who knew him during the early years of his exile in
London, had the ‘‘highest admiration’’ for him and said that ‘‘to
him is mainly owing the unity & freedom of Italy’’ (Mill 1972,
1759).
14This strategy can be used for good or for ill—an example of the
latter being present-day China.
15For an excellent discussion of this sentiment and how it differs
from common contemporary understandings of nationalism, see
Varouxakis (2002).
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their representatives) ‘‘into council’’ with him, thus
creating ‘‘representative institutions without represen-
tative government’’ (CRG 263). The ‘‘political educa-
tion’’ these representatives receive by acting as advisors
is then ‘‘carried home,’’ so to speak, to their constit-
uents, who themselves deliberate on such matters when
they choose (or at least petition) their representatives;
moreover, as Mill explains, a ‘‘tradition is kept up of
government by general consent,’’ one that might
eventually be given greater significance through con-
stitutional codification (CRG 263–64; cf. C 127). Were
this to occur, the transition to a form of democratic
self-government would be nearly complete.16
We now have answers to the first three questions
posed at the end of the previous section: to wit, what
should an enlightened despot improve about his
subjects, how should he do so, and why would these
improvements make eventual self-government possi-
ble? The incremental transition to democracy involves
a step-by-step process of institutional reform (from
slavery and serfdom to peasant proprietorship to
political centralization and finally representative in-
stitutions) that induces a parallel process of character
reform (i.e., the accumulation of a complementary set
of citizen virtues: obedience and patient industry;
intelligence, prudence, and self-control; a willingness
to resist tyranny; and a spirit of nationality). At the
close of this process, the enlightened despot has
managed to create not only a set of democratic
institutions but also a citizenry virtuous enough to
run them. Contra Pitts, Mill has offered us a nuanced,
multistage account of the developmental trajectory
from barbarism to democratic civilization, one that
takes place within (rather than across) societies and
requires both intellectual and moral improvement of
the citizenry (cf. Pitts 2005, 133, 136–37, 139, 141–42).
This leaves the fourth question as yet unanswered:
what would motivate a despot to do any of these
things? On this point Mill is less forthcoming. To be an
enlightened despot, a ruler must have both the ability
and the will, and Mill believes that a sufficiently able
ruler (i.e., ‘‘a monarch of extraordinary genius’’) will be
a ‘‘rare accident’’ (CRG 264). Even assuming that such
a genius (or better, given the scale of the tasks involved,
a succession of geniuses) might achieve absolute polit-
ical power, why would he (or they) set in motion the
processes of institutional and character reform that
would ultimately undermine autocratic rule? Mill hints
at one possible answer during his discussion of the
political history of the Jewish people (CRG 235–36).
He mentions there the conflict between the Jewish
kings and priests and the ‘‘Order of Prophets,’’ whose
divinely inspired challenges to the authority of absolute
monarchy and religious hierarchy prompted both
reinterpretation and reform of the national religion,
and he contends that such an ‘‘antagonism of influ-
ences . . . is the only real security for continued pro-
gress’’ (CRG 235; cf. NI 119). Mill appears to suggest
here that a self-interested struggle between competing
political authorities can generate a kind of progress that
is unintended by the competing parties. The earlier
example of the centralizing monarch may also fit this
model: by encouraging resistance to local tyranny and
by setting up representative institutions (perhaps as a
partial inducement to such resistance or as a means of
obtaining revenue [North 1990, 113]), a monarch may
defeat his competitors only by politically empowering
his own subjects—a concession that will likely come
back to haunt him or his heirs.
Mill was broadly familiar with Kant’s progressive
historical narrative, and his scattered thoughts on the
motivation of enlightened despots parallel Kant’s,
though the latter’s are much more fully developed (Mill
1985, 258–59). Kant also believed that the transition to
representative democracy would take place under the
enlightened rule of an absolute monarch, one who
would lead his subjects from a state of minority (i.e.,
the inability to think for themselves without the
guidance of another) to complete intellectual and
political self-government. The monarch would dis-
charge this task by maintaining public order, protecting
civil liberties including freedom of the press, promoting
(or at least not hampering) public education, and
steadily ceding legislative power to representative in-
stitutions on matters of war, taxation, etc. Most im-
portantly for our purposes, he would be driven to take
these actions—which are wholly contrary to his long-
run interests—by the exigencies of geopolitical compe-
tition: in order to strengthen his society for such
competition and secure the financing needed for mili-
tary campaigns, he would slowly have to enlighten and
empower his own people via religious, socio-economic,
and political reforms. Though each step in this process
would prove in the short-run interest of the monarch, it
would lead to his political disempowerment in the long
run, turning him into a limited, constitutional monarch
constrained by a democratic legislature.17 Kant, in
short, relied upon an international analogue of the
16Mill emphasized that this must be self-government by an entire
population, not just by a tiny minority of whites (with blacks
kept disenfranchised), as was unfortunately the case with Jamai-
can home rule (Miller 2005, 168–69).
17For a detailed analysis of Kant’s theory of democratic tran-
sitions, see Taylor (2006). For a superb discussion of these
characteristics of enlightened despotism in the context of Mill’s
own theory, see Holmes (2007, 328–30, 336–37).
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salutary domestic political competition later identified
by Mill. The two of them seem to be saying the
following: although we might hope for Catherine,
Frederick, and Peter the Greats to do the right thing
for the right reasons, the motivation provided by
competition, be it domestic or international, should
remedy any deficits in political virtue.
Even granting our interpretation of Mill’s ‘‘an-
tagonism of influences’’ argument, he does not seem
particularly optimistic about the possibility of en-
lightened despotism: he clearly doubts the capacities
of native elites, and he says with artful understate-
ment that ‘‘the mere position of the rulers does
not . . . of itself invest them with interests and ten-
dencies operating in the beneficial direction’’ (CRG
264). At this point, however, Mill himself takes an
international turn, introducing his deus ex machina—
an imperialism of the civilized over the uncivilized:
From the general weaknesses of the people or of the
state of civilization, the One [monarch] and his
counselors, or the Few [aristocrats], are not likely
to be habitually exempt, except in the case of their
being foreigners, belonging to a superior people or a
more advanced state of society. Then, indeed, rulers
may be, to almost any extent, superior in civilization
to those over whom they rule; and subjection to a
foreign government of this description, notwith-
standing its inevitable evils, is often of the greatest
advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through
several stages of progress, and clearing away obstacles to
improvement which might have lasted indefinitely if the
subject population had been left unassisted to its native
tendencies and chances. (CRG 264 [emphasis added];
cf. CRG 453–54)
Such an imperialism solves (or at least alleviates) two
problems: first, it explains how a ruler can come to
have the expertise necessary to shepherd a whole
society ‘‘rapidly through several stages of progress’’;
second, it provides a security of tenure unavailable to
‘‘barbarous despotisms,’’ thus allowing time for the
required improvements to take place (CRG 454).
Even assuming these advantages, however, his
proposed solution still leaves our familiar problem
unsolved: motivation. A foreign power would appear,
if anything, still less motivated than a native despot to
carry a subject people to independence and demo-
cratic self-government: a native despot might at least
share a common culture, language, religion, etc., with
his subjects, which could foster concern for their
welfare; such a connection would be missing for the
foreign ruler. Mill offers little help on this point.
When discussing settler colonies from civilized na-
tions, he suggests that retaining ties with them may
promote free trade and also increase the colonizer’s
prestige among other powers, reasons that would
presumably apply to uncivilized dependencies as well,
especially given their usefulness as markets for capital
and suppliers of grain (CRG 451; PPE 189–90, 193–
97; Sullivan 1983, 607–13).18 It is unclear, however,
whether these reasons would translate into a desire to
carry out an ‘‘enlightened imperialism’’; although
establishing the rule of law and financing infrastructure
in these dependencies would facilitate such economic
activity, these would merely be the first of many
required steps towards colonial self-government.
At moments such as this one, Mill has an un-
fortunate tendency to fall back on whatever political
virtue foreign rulers happen to possess: he warns that if
they fail to discharge their duty to advance civilization
in dependent states they are ‘‘guilty of a dereliction of
the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a
nation; and if they do not even aim at it, they are selfish
usurpers’’; he apparently hopes that guilt will promote
progressive policies whenever self-interest fails to do so
(CRG 454). As noted earlier, Mill is certainly aware of
the possibility of abuse and even exploitation in
colonial relations (see, for example, Kohn and O’Neill
2006, 213–17, on the Governor Eyre episode in
Jamaica). His solution to such threats, though, is to
shift colonial administration from the people’s rep-
resentatives to an impartial technocratic elite, which
is how he views officials from his own East India
Company (CRG 454–67). Mill explains here why this
delegation of governing authority will improve on
direct administration by Parliament:
A delegated administration has always this advantage
over a direct one, that it has, at all events, no duty to
perform except to the governed. It has no interests to
consider except theirs. Its own power of deriving
profit from misgovernment may be reduced . . . to a
singularly small amount: and it can be kept entirely
clear of bias from the individual or class interests of
anyone else. (CRG 461–62)
Mill makes a persuasive case that such delegation will
be better than direct administration, owing to the
relative expertise of professional administrators, their
commensurately greater knowledge of native cultures
and concerns, and their insulation from domestic
political pressures. What he does not do is explain
why the interests of these administrators will track
the interests of colonial subjects better than some
native alternative. Even if we assume, as Mill does,
that expertise and security of tenure for (delegated)
18For a brief discussion of character development through the
disinterested bureaucratic rule of settler colonies (as distinct from
the uncivilized dependencies that are our focus), see Bell (2010,
especially 42–43, 46).
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foreign rule by a civilized nation will be superior to
those of a home-grown despotism, it does not follow
that a superior ‘‘identity of interest with the gov-
erned’’ will obtain (CRG 461).
What is surprising is how alive Mill is to this
problem in other contexts, especially in The Subjection
of Women. He says there that ‘‘it would be tiresome
to repeat the commonplaces about the unfitness of
men in general for power’’ and that ‘‘the relation of
superiors to dependants is the nursery of those vices
of character, which, wherever else they exist, are an
overflowing from that source’’ (SW 509–10). If the
arbitrary rule of husbands over wives, where there is
frequently at least some tie of affection or common
interest between governor and governed, is such a
cause of concern for Mill, why would arbitrary
colonial rule in the complete absence of either not
be even more worrisome to him? Mill’s equation of
‘‘backward states of society’’ with children, which we
began the previous section by emphasizing, has as its
complement another, even more troubling equation:
of colonial administrators with parents. However,
there are fundamental differences between improving
yourself and improving others, and between improv-
ing intimate others (e.g., children) and alien others
(e.g., colonial dependants)—differences generated by
dissimilarities across these contexts in the knowledge,
motivation, and sympathy of the purported im-
prover. Does Mill ever recognize these dissimilarities
and, if so, how does he deal with them? To answer
this question and related ones, we must return to his
assessments of colonialism in practice.
Millian Enlightened Despotism: A
Detailed Application to India
The true nature and limits of Millian enlightened
despotism become clearer by examining Mill’s appli-
cation of it, especially two interrelated aspects, to a
particular colonial context. First, we have discussed
the developmental stage of peasant proprietorship as
applied to India—its definition and its relevance in
the Indian context—and we now turn to its role in
the British reform efforts there. Second, we also
examine Mill’s complex, conflicted attitude regarding
the capacity and motivation (or lack thereof) of
India’s colonial administrators.
Mill says that English colonial administrators
‘‘were, at an early period, struck with the importance
of putting an end to this arbitrary character of
the land-revenue, and imposing a fixed limit to the
government demand’’ (PPE 325); that is, they had
every intention of acting like good Millian enlight-
ened despots, advancing the economic interests and
personal development of their colonial wards by
means of institutional reform. Their initial efforts
in this direction, however, were nothing short of
disastrous. Upon surveying the Indian social land-
scape, they misidentified the ‘‘zemindars,’’ a heredi-
tary class of rent collectors for the sovereign, as ‘‘the
proprietors of the soil, the landed nobility and gentry
of India’’ (PPE 325–26). After empowering them as
such, ‘‘they flattered themselves that they had crea-
ted . . . English landlords, and it proved that they had
only erected Irish ones. The new landed aristocracy
disappointed every expectation built upon them.
They did nothing for the improvement of their
estates, but everything for their own ruin’’ (PPE
327). The British government had thus saddled itself
and the ryots with a parasitic landlord class through-
out the land of Bengal. Mill’s explanation for this
spectacular failure of sociological nous is revealing
and bodes ill for his hopes for an enlightened
colonialism: he says of the English government in
India that ‘‘its mistakes arose from the inability of
ordinary minds to imagine a state of social relations
fundamentally different from those with which they
are practically familiar’’ (PPE 325)—the dissimilarity
in contexts explains the failure of understanding, in
short, but it also calls into question the capacity of
colonial administrators to carry their wards ‘‘rapidly
through several stages of progress’’ (CRG 264).
British administration of later colonial acquisi-
tions in India improved, but only gradually and
incompletely. The colonial governors began collect-
ing rents directly, but instead of offering a ‘‘perpetu-
ity of tenure at a fixed rent,’’ they offered longish
leases at rents varying by their own assessments of a
ryot’s ability to pay. In 1871, Mill reports that a
‘‘resolution has been adopted by the Indian govern-
ment of converting the long leases of the northern
provinces into perpetual tenures at fixed rents,’’ thus
belatedly achieving in only a part of India what Mill’s
developmental theory prescribes as an essential step
in individual and societal development (PPE 327–28,
332).
In the course of showing how Mill thought one
stage of his developmental theory should have been
applied in India—but was not, or only belatedly and
partially—we have already begun to identify another
feature of Mill’s attitude towards enlightened colo-
nialism: doubts about the capacity (with respect to
both expertise and security of tenure) and motivation
of British colonial administrators. In fact, Mill’s view
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of British colonialism in India has a self-critical
quality that has been insufficiently noticed. With
regard to (in)capacity, we have already seen Mill’s
highly critical views regarding the bungled, haphaz-
ard transition to peasant proprietorship under British
colonial rule; but his denigration of such rule extends
back even further in time, to the initial extension of
imperial power to India. In subduing the native states
of India, the British had to substitute their military
force for that of the princes whom they had dis-
armed. Mill describes the unintended consequences
as follows:
We engaged that this force should fulfill the purposes
of a force, by defending the prince against all foreign
and internal enemies. But being thus assured of the
protection of a civilized power, and freed from
the fear of internal rebellion or foreign conquest,
the only checks which either restrain the passions or
keep any vigour in the character of an Asiatic despot,
the native Governments either became so oppressive
and extortionate as to desolate the country, or fell
into such a state of nerveless imbecility, that every
one, subject to their own will, who had not the means
of defending himself by his own armed followers, was
the prey of anybody who had a band of ruffians in his
pay . . . . During this period of half a century, England
was morally accountable for a mixture of tyranny and
anarchy, the picture of which, by men who knew it
well, is appalling to all who read it. (NI 119–20
[emphasis added]; also see Miller 2005, 170)
The British state eventually abrogated its treaties with
the native princes and assumed its duties of colonial
government more directly, but, as Mill indicates, it
was an exceedingly slow learner.19
Mill also worries about the nonidentity of interest
between colonial administrators and their wards
(CRG 461). Such identity might be expected to grow
over time as governors learned about and came to
sympathize with those whom they governed, but Mill
remains skeptical of this possibility: as he says,
‘‘foreigners do not feel with the people. They cannot
judge, by the light in which a thing appears to their
own minds, or the manner in which it affects their
feelings, how it will affect the feelings or appear to the
minds of the subject population’’ (CRG 455). As a
result, colonial dependents will remain alien, remov-
ing or weakening an important source of motivation
for enlightened colonial rule, viz. sympathy.
Despite all of this, Mill still retains a remarkable
faith in the capacity and motivation of a specifically
English elite. England, he maintains, has ‘‘attained to
more of conscience and moral principle in its deal-
ings with foreigners, than any other great nation
seems either to conceive as possible, or recognize as
desirable,’’ and it has picked its ‘‘best men,’’ in terms
of ‘‘qualifications [both] moral and intellectual,’’
to carry out these tasks, especially that of colonial
administration (CRG 451, 456, 463–64; cf. NI 111–
12). This trust in English elites is on display both here
and in his defense of plural voting, and in both cases
we discover Mill conflating—whether consciously or
unconsciously—these two types of qualification.
In the midst of a discussion of accountability for
colonial administrators, Mill reminds us that ‘‘opin-
ions may be weighed as well as counted, and the
approbation or disapprobation of one person well
versed in the subject may outweigh that of thousands
who know nothing about it’’; this belief motivates
his argument for giving more votes to the ‘‘higher
moral or intellectual being’’ as well (CRG 334, 460).
Interestingly, in both of these cases, plural voting and
colonialism, Mill gradually lets drop his talk of moral
superiority, focuses on mental superiority alone, and
ultimately proposes ‘‘general’’ and ‘‘competitive’’
exams as the means of allocating votes and colonial
posts, respectively—all while leaving one with the
distinct impression that moral qualifications are still
being selected for (CRG 336, 464; see, e.g., CRG 340,
where his phrasing reverts to ‘‘moral and intellectual
excellence’’). This appears to be mere wishful thinking
by Mill: if intellectual and moral virtues are strongly
positively correlated, selecting for the former via
competitive examinations will automatically select
for the latter, and the ‘‘best men’’ in all relevant
senses will thereby be empowered—but why would
these virtues be so correlated? Ensuring the disinter-
estedness of those entrusted with nearly unfettered
power over colonial dependents will not be so simple.
In Mill’s defense, he would likely emphasize the
unavoidably second-best quality of the colonial enter-
prise. Perhaps superior capacity (at least relative to
native elites) can substitute for a possibly inferior
motivation or disinterestedness; as he sadly notes,
‘‘real good government [foreign or domestic] is not
compatible with the conditions of the [Indian] case.
There is but a choice of imperfections’’ (CRG 461).
He would also urge us not to romanticize native
despotisms but rather to compare real with real:
British colonialism with native despotism as actually
practiced. Throughout his writings, Mill is frank not
only about the failures of British colonialism but
also about the ugliness of what it replaced: ‘‘military
and fiscal rapacity,’’ ‘‘illegal extortions,’’ and other
abuses of power by tyrannical princes and privileged
19Mill is even more harshly critical of the history of British rule in
Ireland (see, e.g., PPE 329–30 and CRG 433).
the self-extinguishing despot 1247
landholders alike; inhumane cultural practices (e.g.,
suttee and ‘‘other modes of self-immolation’’); etc.
(PPE 122, 244, 325; CRG 460; Mill 1990, 27, 123).
Moreover, Mill believes that by selecting the right
form of colonial government, one can minimize the
inevitable motivational deficits of its functionaries
and maximize its capacity (in terms of expertise and
security of tenure). As he describes it, ‘‘the problem
is, so to construct the governing body that, under the
difficulties of the position, it shall have as much
interest as possible in good government, and as little
in bad. Now these conditions are best found in . . . a
delegated administration,’’ in this case his own East
India Company (CRG 461). He says that ‘‘its own
power of deriving profit from misgovernment may be
reduced—in the latest constitution of the East India
Company (EIC) it was reduced—to a singularly small
amount’’ (CRG 462). As for its capacity, Mill
maintains that a delegated body such as the EIC is
‘‘chiefly composed of persons who have acquired
professional knowledge of this part of their coun-
try’s concerns; who have been trained to it in the
place itself, and have made its administration the
main occupation of their lives’’; additionally, their
selection by competitive examination (discussed
above) and their security of tenure as civil servants
guarantee their competence and their ‘‘permanent
interest in the success of their administration, and in
the prosperity of the country which they adminis-
ter’’ (CRG 462–64).
Mill contrasts this kind of delegated body with the
alternative of direct rule by means of a minister
immediately responsible to the British parliament.
The problem with the latter arrangement, as Mill acidly
remarks, is that an ‘‘English Cabinet Minister . . . is
thinking of English, not Indian politics’’ (CRG 461).
Ministers, as members of Parliament, are subject to
popular enthusiasms as well as the demands of power-
ful interest groups. An example of the first is the
popular desire for the religious conversion of Indians,
exemplified by ‘‘the demand now so general in England
for having the Bible taught, at the option of pupils or
of their parents, in the Government schools’’; an
example of the second is the sort of pressure applied
to administrators by ‘‘individuals of the ruling people
who resort to the foreign country to make their
fortunes . . . [who] have the feelings inspired by abso-
lute power, without its sense of responsibility’’ (CRG
457–58). Yielding to these pressures, as elected officials
are likely to do, will not serve the developmental
interests of the dependent population but rather
subject them to religious proselytism and economic
exploitation.
Several of Mill’s claims about the capacity and
motivation of colonial organs like the EIC have been
challenged—at times with his own words. Suppose,
however, that we grant his claims, at least insofar as
they relate to the superiority of the EIC over direct
Parliamentary rule. The following question then
arises: why would a democratic people tie its own
hands by means of a delegated administration? Mill’s
impassioned defense of the EIC in Considerations is
made especially poignant by the fact that Parliament
had already removed its authority in 1858, several
years before Mill’s book was published. Mill himself
perhaps explains why this happened:
Such a thing as government of one people by
another, does not and cannot exist. One people
may keep another as a warren or preserve for its
own use, a place to make money in, a human cattle
farm to be worked for the [spiritual or pecuniary]
profit of its own inhabitants. But if the good of the
governed is the proper business of a government, it is
utterly impossible that a people should directly attend
to it. (CRG 456; emphasis added)
If this is true, then we should expect delegated
administration to be the exception rather than the
rule in imperial democracies, whose popular enthu-
siasms and powerful vested interests militate against
precisely the calm self-restraint, disinterestedness,
and professional expertise provided by the likes of
EIC and the Mills. If this leaves us with the choice
between an evangelical, rapacious democratic im-
perialism and the petty, repulsive native despotisms
it would displace, then neither is the correct choice
clear nor are our options particularly inspiring ones.
The only thing that is certain is that we have traveled
quite far from Mill’s original vision, challenging
yet hopeful, of an enlightened colonialism that
seeks the individual and institutional development
of a subject people and ultimately their political
autonomy.
Conclusion
Far from Mill lacking a detailed narrative of the
evolution of barbarous into civilized societies, he
actually has a finely developed story to tell. Nor does
he ignore the potential pitfalls of empire—notably
abuse and exploitation—but rather folds his solu-
tions to those problems into his larger theory of
enlightened colonialism, as we saw in his application
of it to India. The coherence, depth, moral serious-
ness, and self-critical quality of Mill’s theory of
enlightened despotism have to be understood and
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appreciated before an informed critique—such as this
one—is possible.
Mill’s deviation from his usual stalwart defense of
representative democracy results from his belief that
social, legal, and economic reform under nondemo-
cratic regimes is not just a prelude to but a precondition
of collective self-rule. Such reform would induce
changes in the character, culture, and material condi-
tions of a people that were favorable to the establishment
of democracy. A people of slaves will never be trans-
formed into a self-governing people unless they are led
to acquire virtues not only of obedience and patient
industry, but also of calculating intelligence, prudence,
and self-control. But an enlightened despot must also
cultivate additional democratic virtues, namely a spirit
of nationality and a willingness to resist tyranny. Ironi-
cally, this sets the stage for the despot’s own demise, as
he must transform his rule from a ‘‘government of will
to one of law,’’ and extinguish his own governance in
order to maintain legitimacy. This slow transition to
democracy involves a step-by-step process of institu-
tional reform (from slavery and serfdom to peasant
proprietorship to political centralization and represen-
tative institutions) that induces a parallel process of
character reform. At the conclusion of this process, the
enlightened despot has managed to create not only a
set of democratic institutions but also a citizenry
virtuous enough to run them.
Understanding Mill’s conception of the self-ex-
tinguishing despot and the role he plays in democ-
ratization enriches the existing debate about Mill and
colonialism. The details of this account and its
application to particular colonial contexts allow us
to understand Mill better, to appreciate the unity of
his thought, and to mount a more effective, informed
critique of him than currently exists. Mill is neither a
myopic liberal whose intellectual ken fails to extend
beyond Western societies and their values nor a crude
imperialist masquerading as a thoughtful liberal. Far
from undermining his liberalism, his views on colo-
nialism and underdeveloped societies are an essential
part of his liberal understanding, and his exploration
of the best ways for civilization to evolve demon-
strates the comprehensive scope of his views even as it
raises vital questions for us about the promise and the
dangers of a democratic imperialism.
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